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interesting. The Einsatzgruppen wanted the population to take a part and a

major part at that - of the responsibility for the killing operations. "It was

not less important, for future purposes," wrote Brigadefuhrer Dr. Stahlecker,

"to establish as an unquestionable fact that the liberated population had

resorted to the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy,

on its own initiative and without instructions from German authorities." In

short, the pogroms were to become the defensive weapon with which to confront

an accuser, or an element of blackmail that could be used against the local

population. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 1961, p. 203)

Two of the conclusions that Raul Hilberg draws concerning pogroms in Ukraine flatly contradict

the Wiesenthal-Safer story of a massive pre-German pogrom in Lviv:

First, truly spontaneous pogroms, free from Einsatzgruppen influence, did not

take place; all outbreaks were either organized or inspired by the

Einsatzgruppen. Second, all pogroms were implemented within a short time after

the arrival of the killing units. They were not self-perpetuating, nor could

new ones be started after things had settled down. (Raul Hilberg, The

Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 312)

Raul Hilberg describes what may have been the chief - or the only Lviv pogrom quite

differently - it occurred after the arrival of the Germans, and it did not involve the killing

of 5,000-6,000 Jews:

The Galician capital of Lvov was the scene of a mass seizure by local

inhabitants. In "reprisal" for the deportation of Ukrainians by the Soviets,

1000 members of the Jewish intelligentsia were driven together and handed over

to the Security Police. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews,

1961, p. 204)

But even this milder version of an anti-Jewish eruption - now a post-German one - is not easy to

credit. The arrest of one thousand targeted individuals within a city is something that can

only be done by a large team of professionals backed by a research staff, weapons,

telecommunications equipment, vehicles. Before anyone would undertake such a daunting task,

furthermore, they would need to be assured that the thousand prisoners would be wanted and that

they could be processed - only an ambivalent gratitude might be expected for having herded a

thousand prisoners through the streets to the local police station which was not expecting them

– and so it is implausible that local inhabitants would act without at the very least

consultation and coordination with the occupying authorities. From what we have discussed

above, we would expect the local inhabitants to be devoid of initiative, able to follow orders

perfunctorily in order to save their lives, but quite unable to muster the resources to round up

one thousand individuals on their own. If any such round-up did occur, then, it would more

plausibly have been at the instigation of, and under the direction of, the German occupiers.

But to return to 60 Minutes, the reality is that the sort of pogrom described by Simon

Wiesenthal - massive in scale and initiated by Ukrainians independently of German instigation

never took place. The most that the Germans could incite a small number of Ukrainians to

contribute - and who knows exactly how large a contribution these few Ukrainians really made

alongside the Germans in such actions - was closer to the following:

In Kremenets 100-150 Ukrainians had been killed by the Soviets. When some of

the exhumed corpses were found without skin, rumors circulated that the

Ukrainians had been thrown into kettles full of boiling water. The Ukrainian

population retaliated by seizing 130 Jews and beating them to death with

clubs. ... The Ukrainian violence as a whole did not come up to

expectations. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 1961, p.

204)

But on the principle that the person readiest to contradict Simon Wiesenthal is Simon Wiesenthal

himself, we turn to other statements that he has made:

The Ukrainian police ... had played a disastrous role in Galicia following the

entry of the German troops at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941.

(Simon Wiesenthal, Justice Not Vengeance, 1989, p. 34, emphasis added)

In the same account, Wiesenthal does mention a Lviv pogrom of three day's duration, but

unambiguously places it after the German occupation:

Thousands of detainees were shot dead in their cells by the retreating

Soviets. This gave rise to one of the craziest accusations of that period:

among the strongly anti-Semitic population the rumour was spread by the

Ukrainian nationalists that all Jews were Bolsheviks and all Bolsheviks were

Jews. Hence it was the Jews who were really to blame for the atrocities

committed by the Soviets.

All the Germans needed to do was to exploit this climate of opinion. It is

said that after their arrival they gave the Ukrainians free rein, for three

days, to 'deal' with the Jews. (Simon Wiesenthal, Justice Not Vengeance, 1989,

p. 36, emphasis added)

In conclusion, Mr. Wiesenthal's story of a massive pre-German Lviv pogrom is contradicted by

other testimony, some of it his own. Mr. Safer had the good sense to subtract 3,000 fatalities

from Mr. Wiesenthal's upper estimate of 6,000, suggesting that he too is aware of Mr.

Wiesenthal's unreliability. Had Mr. Safer dared to subtract another 3,000, he would have hit